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The past, as prelude...
The other day, while writing up the report on the last session of play on the fifth day at Nagpur, I'd pointed out that the Indians were taking a page from an Australian playbook, in the way they played.
I found two accounts of that match that spoke of what happened behind the scenes; the more detailed one is by Richie Benaud in The Appeal of Cricket, and as promised, am throwing it up here. (Do note, I am only quoting the relevant bits, not the entire three pages, so if you see a string of dots, you know there's been a jump).
The parallels, actually, begin with the England second innings, when slow scoring meant then captain Michael Atherton delayed his declaration: I said at the time the batsmen should have allowed Atherton to declare, setting a target of 475 and doing so twenty minutes earlier. In the event, the batsmen went too slowly, almost as though they had been playing in a county match with a declaration that might have been pre-determined. It seemed a case of okay, let's set them 450 and we will declare some time before ten past three, to take into account various playing conditions pertaining to lack of intervals... The facts were that England closed their innings at 2.58 pm with the score at 255 for two wickets. What they should have been doing was to be quite satisfied with 280 for eight wickets...
The reason for throwing this bit in here is that I was a touch mystified by England's approach in the final session of day four. Even assuming the tourists never intended to declare late and make the Indian batsmen play out a tricky half hour at the fag end of day four, what puzzled me was this: Alistair Cook working his way at his own pace to a maiden century was understandable, even valuable in terms of what it does for his confidence for the rest of the series. But why would a Paul Collingwood need to nudge the ball around, and play out what felt at the time were way too many dot balls? You had to figure England all along meant to declare at close -- wouldn't they then have been better served by going after the bowlers from at least one end, with the likes of Collingwood and Flintoff and even Geraint Jones? And in the process, look not only to batter the Indian bowlers psychologically, but add another 50-odd runs, that would ensure against a hijack and at the same time let England keep attacking fields for far longer on day five?
Back to Benaud:The Australians began their innings at 3.08 pm on the fourth afternoon, they needed 449 to win and a minimum of 128 overs had been set by the umpires. By the time the day's play had been concluded, Australia had wiped off 139 of those runs with a scintillating display of batsmanship from Taylor and Slater.
They were batting on what was the equivalent of a third-day SCG pitch which was still good and was likely to be in reasonable shape on the final day as well. The light rain which had fallen at different times during the match, the early morning rolling, and a lack of wear and tear on the surfce had meant there was very little deterioration, though, as always at the SCG, much depends on how the ball swings; that has little do do with the pitch, other than relating to wear and tear on the ball. On this occasion, swing was non-existent....
England must have come off the field very disappointed at not having taken a wicket and they might have even felt a little nervous at the thought of Australia on the final day needing only 310 to win. They shouldn't have done. No team with any kind of a half-decent bowling attack and a captain with intelligence at Test level is going to allow the opposition to make 449 to win....
Atherton's problem throughout the final day was going to be keeping his tactics up with the play. He needed, in fact, to be a couple of ov ers ahead of the play, judging what the opposition would be thinking, particularly the moment when Australia would call off the run chase, because from that moment on it would be all bluff from Mark Taylor's side...
By the time lunch came along on the final day, England had done very well in the saving of the game, not well towards winning it because they hadn't yet taken a wicket. What they had done was restrict Australia to 67 in the fill two hours of the first session and that was the absolute end of a victory chase for the Australians.
I have seen many games where the fourth innings has gone well for a time, very few where the impetus is maintained right through the innings for victory. It all comes down to fear. Not physical fear, but fear of losing and fear of the fourth innings syndrome in a cricket match. It's all right being 448 behind when you start your own first innings; you have a second chance, but to be that many in arrears when you are playing your second innings is another matter. You have no second chance. It is this psychological block that poses problems as soon as a wicket falls. Two quick wickets and suddenly there is a mist across yourr brain as batting captain and you are becoming very nervous...
Follows, a report on the dismissal of Michael Slater after lunch, to an outstanding catch by Phil Tufnell in the deep. And then this:As soon as David Boon instead of Mark Waugh came through the gate at first wicket down, there ws no question the Australians had shut up shop. Would England realise that? Would Atherton get himself two overs ahead of the play? The answer was no, but the Australians did con Atherton with their mid-wicket conferences every over, their obvious interest in the electronic scoreboard, and body language which signalled they were still in the chase for runs.
The only thing they didn't do was pull out a calculator and start doing their sums.
Taylor's only interest was in being there for the second new ball because he had a good idea of the pressure there would be on his team if wickets started to fall. In fact, the Australian captain was the second to go, playing no stroke at Devon Malcolm and having his off stump cartwheeled back near the wicket-keeper.
Now there was a problem, accentuated by David Boon's dismissal, followed swiftly by those of Michael Bevan, Steve Waugh and Mark Waugh. The Australians lost 4/24 in 41 balls, 5/27 in 53 balls, and when Ian Healy was caught at the wicket by Rhodes off Fraser, Australia still had to survive another 18 overs with only three wickets in hand, two of whom were on a pair and the other, Fleming, had lasted one ball in the first innings. There is much more, including a description of how Shane Warne and Tim May batted an hour and 26 minutes to save the game. Benaud talks of how Atherton, conned earlier by the Aussies into thinking the chase was still on, kept his men in the outfield and thus failed to press home for a win with pace and close catching men.
In many ways, this is the antithesis to Nagpur -- in the Sydney game the Aussies made their push early then throttled back when Slater left; here, the Indians would likely have looked to Sehwag to launch them but he left without opening his account, so the gameplan was the reverse, with defensive play through the first two sessions to first save the game, then that assault at the end to scare the heck out of the fielding side.
But in many ways, I found this bit in Benaud's book redolent of Nagpur. His comments, for instance, on the fourth innings syndrome. Also, using a static match situation to slip a little needle under the opponents' skin, as Australia did there by keeping England on tenterhooks, and India did here with a feint towards the target I suspect they had no serious intention of trying for anyway.
In any case, a page from the past for your reading pleasure. For me, back to the grind; I have to finish regular work today so as to be freed up before the second Test begins, so over and out for the day, see you guys sometime in my afternoon tomorrow.
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